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believes that such preaching helps to give to all preaching the needed simplicity, vividness, and concreteness. He insists that if the children's sermon precedes the sermon to adults, the themes of the two sermons should harmonize, so that the entire service may be unified. He is inclined to think, however, that the average preacher may do his best pulpit work as he preaches the single sermon in which he holds clearly in mind the needs of the children as of the adults.

The book is enriched by illustrations from the author's wide reading and deep experience of life. The occasional repetitions of thought and phrase would seem better suited to the spoken lecture than to the written book.

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HAERING'S DOGMATICS

One is glad to see this publication, in English translation, of the theological system of the well-known Ritschlian theologian, Professor Theodor Haering, of Tübingen.¹ One notes the insistence, so characteristic of the school of Ritschl, that the basis of the religious knowledge on which systematic theology must be built is, on the subjective side, the consciousness of *value* received by those who have in faith responded to Jesus Christ as the historical revelation of God, and, on the objective side, this historical *revelation* which itself gives rise to Christian faith. "A truth of Christian faith must have immediate value for Christian experience"; but "it is not the subjective experience which furnishes the adequate ground of the truth, but the divine revelation, as it proves its reality to human need" (pp. 110, 111). "The believer does not regard what is valuable as real, because it is valuable for him, but because it meets him as real; . . . however, not as a reality which no one can deny—rather as one which only he can acknowledge who is willing to acknowledge its value personally" (p. 67).

In spite of these well-balanced statements, however, and notwithstanding the reiterated emphasis upon the fundamental facts of revelation, it must be said that, philosophically considered, Haering's system does not quite succeed in avoiding that Kantian absolute dualism of the experienced and the independently real which has made the possibility

¹ *The Christian Faith: A System of Dogmatics*. By Theodor Haering. Translated from the second (1912) German edition, by John Dickie and George Ferries. London, New York, and Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. 2 vols. xi+487, xi+(952-487=) 465 pages. \$6.00.

of knowledge so persistent and yet so insoluble a problem. One symptom of this *epistemological* dualism (of the experienced which is not independently real, and the independently real which is not experienced) is the prominence given to the familiar Kantian *logical* dualism (of theoretical knowledge which is not adequate for practical needs, and practical knowledge which is not theoretically valid). Knowledge, which is of phenomena, the contents of actual and possible human experience, is incompetent in the realm of religion; it can never show that God exists, nor, if he exists, what he is. But while it cannot affirm, it cannot deny; faith is left absolutely free, so far as knowledge is concerned. Thus "real agnosticism," it is claimed, "can be a true ally of faith" (pp. 151-59, 244-49, 257).

As a result of this more or less successfully veiled religious agnosticism, theology cannot become what its name would imply, a science of the divine Reality, or God; it can only be the science of a particular sort of faith about that Reality (pp. 2, 249-52, etc.). And in spite of his oft-repeated emphasis upon the fundamental importance of "revelation," it would seem that, strictly speaking, Haering's philosophy leaves no room, really, for genuine *revelation*. That the divine Reality is ever immediately present within human conscious experience seems not to be intended in what is said of revelation. Mysticism, although acknowledged as a hopeful feature of "the modern consciousness," is not regarded as having knowledge value. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit within the church is interpreted ethically rather than metaphysically. And, while Haering has probably succeeded better than any others of the Ritschlians, unless it be Max Reischle, or the elder Ritschl himself, in defending his theological system against the charge (which all good Ritschlians resent) of "subjectivism," it is nevertheless true (as Luedemann, for instance, in his *Das Erkennen und die Werturteile*, has pointed out) that a vicious circle in this doctrine of revelation seems unavoidable. On the one hand, "it is only upon condition of trust that the revelation of our God . . . discloses itself," and on the other hand, it is revelation which gives rise to faith (pp. 241, 242, etc.). In short, revelation is the presence within human experience, e.g., in history, of some fact which impels us to believe in God's redemptive love, and which, believed in, does psychologically condition a redemptive ethical experience in us. On the ground, then, of its value for us, together with the rather ambiguous interpretation of the historical fact as "revelation," "religious knowledge" is claimed.

The point in criticism which we are here trying to make may seem an unimportant one. As a matter of fact the method employed by

Haering is admirably fitted to *select* the essentially Christian content from our traditional Christian dogmas and speculations—the content, moreover, with reference to which vital Christian religious experience does lead one to feel assured. But it seems not unfair to say that from the first there has been in this Ritschlian philosophy of religious knowledge an incurable weakness in the matter of apologetics; it is much more efficient in conserving the faith of modern-minded men who are already Christian than in leading those who are not experientially Christian to regard the essentials of Christian belief as even probably true.

The trouble, at least in so far as it is philosophical, lies, we would venture to suggest, in the absolute dualism of the Kantian theory of knowledge, carried over into the field of religion. Ritschl was right in reacting against the monistic theory of knowledge in its idealistic form as he found it in Hegelianism; better a Christian agnosticism than a pantheism, which, so far as the *practical* phase of religion was concerned, *logically* meant atheism. If, however, there can be found a tenable philosophy of religious knowledge, such as would allow the thought of the actual *immanence*, in religious experience at its best, of the divine—some phase of the actual life of an also *transcendent* God—then, on the basis of such *bona fide* revelation, one might build up theology as such a descriptive empirical science as would be able to claim a rightful and most important place in a metaphysical synthesis of the empirical sciences. And from this point of view there could be not only this more unequivocal appeal to revelation, but also a less objectionable use made of the appreciation of religious value in the interests of knowledge. The consciousness of religious value would be a means of selecting the *peculiarly* divine from the total content of human experience, thus discharging an important function in connection with religious perception.

But to return to Haering. The central and indeed essential place he gives to *historical* revelation makes it necessary for him to give considerable attention to the question of the historicity of Jesus. Not every detail of the Gospel narrative, he recognizes, is important in this connection; but the figure of Jesus in history must be sufficiently recognizable and definite to evoke in us the assurance that God was working in him (p. 207). The historicity of Jesus must not only be irrefutable and probable enough to enable the religiously susceptible to surrender with good conscience to the impression made by the person of Jesus, as convincing us of the love and redemptive activity of God (p. 218): “let us suppose that a future, however distant, will prove that Jesus is only a creation of faith, and it is all over with faith” (p. 217). This seems

to leave the basis of our religious knowledge rather too much at the mercy of the historian. Our suggested view of the actual immanence of God in Christ would also call for his actual immanence, even if less completely, in every manifestation of the Christlike spirit, so that the historicity of no *one* recorded fact or unrepeatable series of facts, however valuable, would be absolutely a matter of life and death to our religion.

When he comes to doctrinal details, Haering rightly makes very central the thought of the divine Providence. "All real religion," he says, "is faith in Providence" (p. 514). "Prayer is the exercise of this faith" (p. 528). "God's providential care," however, he insists, "aims at realizing the Kingdom of God. Does this aim not apply to our earthly well-being? Nor to the advancement of civilization? Nor to blessings of such high value as the family and the fatherland? No, we reply, but to the Kingdom of God, for the supreme purpose is this Kingdom of God" (p. 518). And there is one "immovably firm foundation" of this faith in Providence, viz., "the reality of the love of God which appears in the history of divine Revelation culminating in Jesus, in his Cross—this seeming contradiction of all Providence" (pp. 525-26). It would be a further step, and one which Haering does not take, although perhaps it would prove of great value in practical religion, to say that the only direct "special providences" we have any right to believe in are such uplifts in the spiritual life of individuals and communities as come in response to the right religious attitude on the part of man. This view also would be more tenable on the theory of actual immanence which we have mentioned, than on that of the dualistic theory of religious knowledge derived from Kant and Ritschl.

Haering's attitude toward the problem of religion, however, is, on the whole, admirable. He is both free and cautious, both liberal and conservative. Perhaps he goes too far at times in the attempt to find an essentially Christian element in traditional beliefs of Christians; in particular, to one who does not share his ecclesiastical prejudices, his labored interpretation of the sacramental value of infant baptism (pp. 760-61) may seem very artificial and unconvincing. But when we come to the great fundamental themes of Christian doctrine, as a rule we find his formulation both amply conservative in the religious side and yet refreshingly independent, not to say original, in mode of conception and statement. The priestly work of Christ, it is interesting to note, is found in his prophetic work (of revealing God to man), *viewed as having value for God himself*, because of its influence upon men (pp. 644-45, 648). And the following is his way of stating the doctrine of the Trinity:

"The Revelation of God which is given us in Jesus Christ is not a chance and passing glimpse which may be superseded by another, but is actually the full self-revelation of God, of Holy Love. And when God in Christ awakens in his church, and in each individual amongst us, faith and personal trust in this love of his, that is actually personal spiritual communion with himself" (p. 921).

Haering's book is one which could be used with profit in the theological classroom. To the liberally disposed, it may show how much more conservative of the vital religious content of Christian tradition than he had supposed, it is possible for the free and honest thinker still to be; to the conservative it may show how safe it is to sever the enslaving bonds of literalistic traditionalism. The translators are to be thanked for having made so valuable a work accessible to the very large number who read widely in this general field, but only what is published in English. There are many other works in the philosophy of religion and systematic theology, untranslated as yet, which such readers would welcome, and it is to be hoped that the generation will not be allowed to pass without such works as Kaftan's *Dogmatik*, Wernle's *Einführung*, and some of Troeltsch's *Schriften* being made available for the English reader.

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POPULAR ESSAYS ON CURRENT RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

Theologians are not the only thinkers interested in religion. To be sure, we have been wont to include philosophers as having at least a speculative interest therein. But within recent years we have had an increasing number of practical men of science volunteering an interest in one or another phase of religion. It is refreshing to find within the compass of a brief discussion a treatment of the relations of religion and science so fresh and forceful as that which Professor Keyser has given us in this Phi Beta Kappa address.¹ Professor Keyser rejects the position that religion is essentially idea or concept. It cannot be subject-matter for science, since science destroys what it analyzes. It can be known only through the appropriate emotions. The theory of Professor Gilbert Murray and others, that religion has to do essentially with the uncharted, is controverted; and it is shown that, even if this theory were true, it could not mean an end to religion, since the uncharted

¹ *Science and Religion, the Rational and the Superrational*. By Cassius J. Keyser. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. 75 pages. 75 cents.